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KIOBEL AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY: HERE,
(NOT) THERE, (NOT EVEN) EVERYWHERE
EDWARD T. SWAINE *
Title notwithstanding, the Beatles’ “Here, There and Everywhere” is
relentlessly local.1 The object of affection is wanted everywhere, just so
long as it’s next to Paul: the song could have been called “Here,” but the
chorus would have suffered.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 2
was also relentlessly, and unexpectedly, local in character. Notwithstanding
the global outlook suggested by the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which
governs civil actions by “an alien” for torts contrary to “the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States,”3 the Court invoked the presumption
against extraterritoriality to limit the statute’s reach.4 Several years later,
and notwithstanding the Court’s subsequent instruction in RJR Nabisco,
Inc. v. European Community, 5 courts and commentators still struggle to
find its governing principle—and, for those trying to put the ATS to some
use, that limiting principle’s own metes and bounds.
There was, as always, a silver lining for advocates of the ATS. Many
suppose a frontier remains open given the majority’s cryptic suggestion that
ATS claims may “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . .
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.” 6 Others note Justice Kennedy’s pronouncement, in his
concurrence, that future cases might require future opinions—the equivalent
of declaring terra incognita, though in this case due more to the
cartographer’s indecision than to any dearth of information about the
terrain. 7 Still others took heart in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. This Article is based
on remarks delivered at the University of Oklahoma Law School in October 2015, but
updated to reflect the subsequent decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, 136 S.
Ct. 2090 (2016). I would like to thank Alden DiIanni-Morton for excellent research
assistance.
1. THE BEATLES, REVOLVER (Capitol Records 1990) (1966). But then there’s THE
BEATLES, Across the Universe, on LET IT BE (Abbey Road 1970).
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
4. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
5. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
6. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
7. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Other cases may arise with allegations of
serious violations of international law principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by
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judgment, for himself and three others, that would have taken territory into
account—not as part of the presumption against extraterritoriality—but not
determinatively, where other features implicated American equities.8 The
result was that additional factors, like wrongdoing by American nationals
(or domiciliaries), 9 or other interests, 10 might permit the statute to reach
overseas conduct.
Naturally, ATS skeptics view Kiobel differently. Many of those
concerned about the use of U.S. courts to address foreign controversies—
including some of those courts themselves—welcomed the result and took a
broader view of the majority’s implications for future cases. 11 Those
looking for absolutes tended to embrace Justice Alito’s concurrence, which
would have given bite to the presumption by suggesting that claims
touching and concerning anywhere else fall outside the statute—to critics,
something painfully close to asserting that the “there” excluded from the
ATS is nearly “everywhere.” 12
This Article tries to determine which reading of Kiobel is best and which
is likely to prevail—having benefit, in the latter regard at least, of RJR
Nabisco, but handicapped by heightened uncertainty about the Court’s
composition. 13 Kiobel was a 5-4 decision, with the late Justice Scalia siding
with the majority 14—meaning that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the

the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in
those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial
application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”).
8. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The
Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1775-76 (2014)
(focusing on nationality).
10. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 8 (2013) (reviewing possibilities).
11. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects Universal
Jurisdiction, FORBES.COM (Apr. 21, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
realspin/2013/04/21/the-supreme-court-unanimously-rejects-universal-jurisdiction/#3c6d131
b4af5.
12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A] putative ATS cause of
action will fall within the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will
therefore be barred—unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law
norm that satisfies Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
nations.”).
13. At the time of the symposium, the late Justice Scalia was still serving on the Court
and the petition for certiorari in RJR Nabisco had just been granted; at the time this Article
was finalized, no replacement had been confirmed.
14. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
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judgment had as much support among those now serving on the Court as
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion did—and RJR Nabisco was a 4-3
decision (rendered after Justice Scalia’s passing) in which Justice
Sotomayor, who had sided with Justice Breyer in Kiobel, recused herself. 15
If one takes the decisions as written, and assumes that the Court will follow
issues resolved in them on the basis of stare decisis, how can we expect the
Court would resolve a subsequent matter concerning extraterritoriality and
the ATS?
Unsurprisingly, given its title, this Article puts a heavy emphasis on
territoriality—not, it should be stressed, as a matter of normative
preference, but purely as a reflection of the Court’s recent cases. It is
accordingly inconsistent with some of the more expansive readings of the
ATS, though it stops short of Justice Alito’s prescription. If future cases are
to depart substantially from territoriality, the better path is not to explore
what Kiobel left unresolved, but to revisit what it purported to settle.
I. Invoking the Presumption
Kiobel migrated from being a case about whether the ATS permitted
corporate liability16 to one concerning “[w]hether and under what
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign
other than the United States” 17—or, as the Chief Justice Roberts put it in
the majority opinion, “[W]hether a claim may reach conduct occurring in
the territory of a foreign sovereign.” 18
Not slow on the uptake, respondents thereafter emphasized the
presumption against extraterritoriality (more exactly, “the presumption

15. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
16. The petition for certiorari sought review of whether corporations were liable like
other private party defendants for violations of the law of nations, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari without changing the questions presented. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (Mem.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel, 132 S.
Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491). In its decision on the merits, the Court said it had formerly
been addressing the question of the lower court’s decision that “the law of nations does not
recognize corporate liability”—fair, so far as it goes, but certainly shifting to the
international law question, and indicating that it had ultimately decided to bypass that.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
17. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (Mem.) (citation
omitted).
18. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
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against extraterritorial application”). 19 That presumption, as the Court had
explained not long before Kiobel, meant that “[w]hen a statute gives no
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”20 The
presumption’s rationale varied. Early on, the concern was that
extraterritoriality might violate the law of nations: since statutes were not to
be construed to violate international law if it could be avoided,
extraterritorial application would not be presumed. 21 A second rationale
was “to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord.” 22 Such a clash
might be intended; the key is to avoid having the judiciary make the choice
for the United States. 23 Third, the canon reflected “[t]he presumption that
United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world” 24—
because, irrespective of any clash with foreign law, Congress “is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions.” 25
Kiobel followed other recent cases in neglecting the first rationale,
concerning compatibility with international law;26 this was consistent, as
19. Id. (explaining policies behind “the presumption against extraterritorial
application”). Similar phrasing was employed throughout Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247 (2010), the leading case prior to Kiobel.
20. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949))).
21. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to
prescribe.”). See generally John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104
AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 (2010) (proposing “a presumption that federal law does not extend
beyond the jurisdictional limits set by international law”).
22. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
23. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (“For us to run
interference in . . . a delicate field of international relations there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary
to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international
discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.”).
24. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
25. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285). In Morrison, the
Court made clear that the clash highlighted in Aramco was not a prerequisite. Morrison, 561
U.S. at 255 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993)); see also
RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016).
26. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (“We know of no one who thought that the Act was
intended to ‘regulat[e]’ foreign securities exchanges—or indeed who even believed that
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noted below, with the Court’s informal presumption that questions of
international law are usually best skirted. (Certainly one might expect that it
would be unenthusiastic about ducking Kiobel’s original inquiry, involving
difficult appraisals of the international law on corporate liability, only to
grapple with international conundrums concerning jurisdiction.) Kiobel did
rely to at least some degree on the second and third rationales. 27 And it
described a fourth, slightly broader one: “[E]nsur[ing] that the Judiciary
does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign
policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.” 28 This
reinforced the idea that foreign policy consequences other than clashes
between U.S. and foreign law might animate the presumption. Taken
seriously, it might also justify invoking the presumption when there was
room to doubt the assumption (integral to the third rationale) that Congress
was “primarily concerned with domestic conditions”—as when, say, the
statute’s topic was the law of nations.
The Court described such rationales largely by way of background,
rather than suggesting that one or more must be met each time the
presumption is applied to a particular statute. Even when it related them to
the ATS, 29 it was for a special reason: as the Court conceded, the
presumption was “typically appl[ied] . . . to discern whether an Act of
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad,” 30 and it had previously
determined in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS was a “‘strictly
jurisdictional’” statute that did not “directly regulate conduct or afford
relief.” 31 Nevertheless, the Court thought that “the principles underlying the

under established principles of international law Congress had the power to do so.”
(alteration in original)).
27. See, as to the second rationale, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1664 (2013) (first quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; then quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at
147) as to the second rationale. See id. (quoting Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454). The third
rationale was less conspicuous, though Justice Breyer attributed it to the Kiobel majority.
See id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
28. Id. at 1664 (majority opinion). The Court also discussed objections by foreign states
to extraterritorial application of the ATS, as well as a scenario in which foreign states would
feel at liberty to apply similar approaches to conduct of U.S. citizens. See id. at 1669.
29. Id. at 1664-65, 1667, 1669.
30. Id. at 1664.
31. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).

28

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:23

canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of
action that may be brought under the ATS.” 32
Still, applying the presumption to jurisdictional statutes was
controversial. To minimize the novelty, one could seize on this reference in
Kiobel to the constraint of the “principles underlying” the presumption, as
opposed to the constraints of the presumption itself. 33 Yet no such
distinction seems to have been intended, since the Court concluded that “the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS.” 34
And nothing in its subsequent decision in RJR Nabisco suggested
otherwise. There, the Court not only recalled Kiobel’s reasoning, 35 but
added that the presumption against territoriality required rebuttal
“regardless of whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords
relief, or merely confers jurisdiction.” 36
To be sure, despite what the Court said, there’s reason to resist the idea
that the presumption generally applies to jurisdictional statutes, as opposed
to causes of action implied under a jurisdictional statute. 37 Perhaps future

32. Id. After discussing said principles, the Court confirmed that the presumption
applied to the ATS. Id. at 1665 (“The principles underlying the presumption against
extraterritoriality thus constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.”).
33. Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent
with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1687-89 (2014) (suggesting, more
generally, that the Court applied a presumption against universality, as opposed to one
against extraterritoriality).
34. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Court went on to address whether, “even if the
presumption applies,” it may yet be rebutted. Id. at 1665. As discussed below, moreover, the
Court found “nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption” and that the claims concerned
did not “displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. at 1669. The Court
also dispensed for the most part with discussing the principles underlying the presumption
and considered the presumption directly. See id. at 1666, 1669. This did not mean the Court
avoided discussing the underlying rationale. See id. at 1668 (adverting to “the weighty
concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality”).
35. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01 (2016).
36. Id. at 2101.
37. A point stressed by William Dodge, who notes how RJR Nabisco and prior cases
like Morrison appeared to focus on the substantive statutes at issue rather than the
underlying jurisdictional ones, and who suggests that the hazards of extending the
presumption to general jurisdiction statutes (like 28 U.S.C. § 1331) mean that the Court
could not have intended to encompass jurisdictional statutes generally. William S. Dodge,
The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes,
OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/; William S.
Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional
Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-
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cases will draw sub-categorical distinctions among types of jurisdictional
statutes, or perhaps inquire (as in Kiobel) whether the policies behind the
presumption are served before assessing jurisdictional statutes, or perhaps it
will consider the presumption to be non-jurisdictional in character even
when bearing on jurisdictional statutes. 38 For ATS purposes, at least, RJR
Nabisco indicated that the jurisdictional nature of that particular statute
made no difference, and further portended that “certain applications of [a]
statute” might trigger a separate application of the presumption—in the case
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO),
requiring examination not only the predicate offenses, but also the
substantive provisions of RICO itself and its remedial provisions.39
Having disregarded the potential distinctiveness of jurisdictional statutes,
Kiobel also showed little interest in drawing lines based on other
jurisdictional questions. 40 Although it has been said that Kiobel rejected
universal jurisdiction 41—leaving territoriality or some other theory as a
prescriptive basis justifying the ATS under international law—the Court
exhibited no interest in the question. 42 The most that can be said is that,
given the Court’s truncation of the ATS’s geographic reach, the ATS no
longer depended on universal jurisdiction. By the same token, Kiobel made
clear, if it were necessary, that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies regardless of the particular basis for jurisdiction under constitutional
or international law.
As a related matter, the Court was also unreceptive to the argument that
the nature of the offenses concerned was reason to avoid invoking the
presumption. As previously, the Court distinguished between
post-dodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-statutes/. As noted in the
text, there may be other possible distinctions.
38. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65. In Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., the Court
specifically addressed extraterritoriality as “a merits question” distinct from subject-matter
jurisdiction. 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010). Since Kiobel, some lower courts have understood
extraterritoriality to pose a jurisdictional issue in the fullest sense, though it is just one of
many. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2014) (describing the
issue as jurisdictional, but not addressing it first, and noting that the order of inquiry among
jurisdictional questions is a matter of discretion).
39. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100-01.
40. It also failed to engage the issue of the constitutional basis for the ATS, variously
stated to be either the Offenses Clause or Article III’s grant of foreign diversity jurisdiction
over controversies between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens.
41. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort
Statute's Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 149 (2013).
42. Justice Breyer, at least, mentioned the issue in passing. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673, 1676 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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acknowledging the existence of global norms and recognizing a cause of
action. 43 The latter, its ostensible concern, might entail defining the norm,
indicating who could be liable (a question that probably loomed large,
given the original issue of corporate liability in Kiobel), establishing
(potentially) rules of exhaustion and statutes of limitations, and so forth. 44
“Each of these decisions,” the Court stressed, “carrie[d] with it significant
foreign policy implications.” 45 Others, naturally, might say that limiting
causes of action also had significant policy implications, but the Court’s
view of the status quo ex ante led it to be less concerned about that.
II. Rebutting the Presumption
Assuming the presumption against territoriality is germane—because a
claim, arising under virtually any kind of statute, entails reaching outside
the United States—what happens then? As synthesized by the Court in RJR
Nabisco, the “first step” is to “ask whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a
clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”46 This burdens
Congress with the obligation to indicate, somehow, that the relevant
statutory provision should apply extraterritorially. Kiobel provided an
example of the provision establishing jurisdiction over genocide, which
applies “‘regardless of where the offense is committed’ if the alleged
offender is, among other things, ‘present in the United States.’” 47 On the
other hand, it is not enough for a statute to use indiscriminate language like
“any” or “every,” as the ATS does in referring to “any civil action.” 48 Nor
does the term “torts” do the trick, even when coupled with the historical
understanding of transitory torts. 49
The Court accepted that “context,” not just text, might overcome the
presumption, but took a narrow view of the contextual evidence presented
to it. 50 Of the three offenses the First Congress might have had in mind
when it enacted the ATS, two (offenses against ambassadors, and violations
43. Id. at 1664-66 (majority opinion).
44. Id. at 1665.
45. Id.
46. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
47. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 ed., Supp. V)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1665-66.
50. Id. at 1666 (“‘[A]ssuredly context can be consulted’ in determining whether a cause
of action applies abroad” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. 561 U.S. 247, 265)
(2010))).
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of safe passage) were fully capable of arising within the United States. 51
The outlier was the third, piracy. If Congress had piracy in mind—which
does not, by its nature, arise from conduct taking place within the United
States—how could it not have contemplated extraterritorial application?
And wasn’t the Court to suppose Congress had done so, given that the
Court “has generally treated the high seas the same as foreign soil for
purposes of the presumption”? 52
The Court’s answer was that it was less problematic to apply U.S. law to
piracy than to “conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of
another sovereign,” since the latter carried more “direct foreign policy
consequences.” 53 Pirates were distinct, the Court reckoned, as they “were
fair game wherever found, by any nation, because they generally did not
operate within any jurisdiction.” 54 Congress’ anticipation “of a cause of
action against them” was not, therefore, “a sufficient basis for concluding
that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur
within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category
unto themselves.” 55
One can dispute the Court’s understanding of how far claims against
pirates would have been thought to reach, since piracy did plausibly
implicate conduct taken on foreign shores as well. 56 Even if one accepts the
51. Id.
52. As the Court noted, this meant it had previously declined to construe statutes as
applying to conduct on the high seas. Id. at 1667 (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993), and Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U.S. 428, 440 (1989)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1667-68. The Court discussed a much-controverted opinion by Attorney
General William Bradford addressing conduct by U.S. citizens who, as part of a French
privateer fleet, committed piratical acts against the British colony of Sierra Leone—
notwithstanding American neutrality. Id. at 1667. Explaining U.S. authority to the British
Ambassador, Attorney General Bradford stated:
So far . . . as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a
foreign country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts; nor can the
actors be legally prosecuted or punished for them by the United States. But
crimes committed on the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the . . . courts
of the United States; and, so far as the offence was committed thereon, I am
inclined to think that it may be legally prosecuted in . . . those courts. . . . But
some doubt rests on this point, in consequence of the terms in which the
[applicable criminal law] is expressed. But there can be no doubt that the
company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a
remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
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Court’s premises, however, its reasoning about the piracy counterexample
was far from obvious. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to each statutory provision, since even
“[w]hen a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the
presumption against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its
terms.” 57 That applies awkwardly to the ATS, since there the selfsame
statutory provision governing piracy also applies to other offenses. Two
possible solutions spring to mind. First, one might be forced to generalize
from the case of piracy to all ATS-cognizable offenses and reckon that the
ATS was intended to apply outside the United States even if not,
necessarily, to conduct within other states—a principle of contraterritoriality. Nothing in the Court’s provision-by-provision approach
required the further step of recalculating what Congress contemplated for
every potential action arising under a given provision, so it might be
enough to conclude that Congress had anticipated some foreign application
and then apply that inference consistently to other territorial questions
arising under the same provision.58 Second, and at the other end of the
spectrum, one might conduct an offense-by-offense reckoning as to whether
Congress had rebutted the presumption. Unfortunately, Congress left few
solid clues as to what offenses it had in mind, let alone the proper

expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only,
in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .
Id. at 1667-68 (alterations in original) (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57,
58-59 (1795)). As the Court noted, the significance turned in part on what Bradford meant
by “these acts of hostility” subject to civil jurisdiction: in particular, whether he meant them
to include the acts “originat[ing] or [taking] place in a foreign country” that had been
definitively excluded from the reach of criminal jurisdiction, or whether they were limited to
“crimes committed on the high seas,” which he thought were within U.S. criminal
jurisdiction but on which “some doubt” might remain. Id. The Court declined to rest on his
opinion, which it noted had been variously interpreted even by the Solicitor General,
because “it deals with U.S. citizens who, by participating in an attack taking place both on
the high seas and on a foreign shore, violated a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain.” Id. at 1668.
57. Id. at 1667 (first quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. 561 U.S. 247, 265
(2010); then citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455-56 (2007)).
58. See 561 U.S. at 264-65, 265 n.8. This would be consistent with the approach
recently taken by the D.C. Circuit, which reaffirmed that when a substantive offense
established by statute (in that case, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act) applied
extraterritorially, ancillary offenses like conspiracy would as well; extraterritoriality would,
in other words, be imputed to the offenses arising under a statute with extraterritorial reach
even if they had not been individually addressed by Congress. United States v. Ballestas,
795 F.3d 138, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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geographic scope of each, besides (the Court supposed) its awareness of
three offenses that were prominent in 1789. 59 Still, one might try to reckon
which modern offenses particularly resembled piracy and which did not—
an inquiry above and beyond the Sosa-mandated inquiry into whether
modern offenses met other threshold criteria attributed to the original
troika. 60
The Court embraced neither approach. Instead, it considered piracy,
insofar as it contemplated extraterritorial claims, to be unrepresentative, at
best licensing consideration of claims arising outside the United States . . .
when they involved piracy. 61 Addressing the ATS as a whole, rather than
on an offense-by-offense basis, the Court concluded: “[T]he presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and . . . nothing
in the statute rebuts that presumption,” such that “petitioners’ case seeking
relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United
States”—irrespective of their footing in the international law concerning
extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and other wrongs—“is barred.” 62
As this implies, the Court took the extraordinary nature of the alleged
offenses as lacking even ordinary weight in assessing whether Congress had
overcome the presumption, just as their nature made no difference in
whether the presumption would apply in the first place. If anything, oddly
enough, their gravity backfired. The Court invoked the concern it felt
animated the ATS, which was the avoidance of diplomatic strife, in arguing
that providing extraterritorial causes of action could actually generate
strife—or, at least, cause other “serious foreign policy consequences” of the
kind animating the presumption against extraterritoriality, like emboldening
other states to consider the liability of U.S. citizens for acts taken in the
United States or anywhere. 63 For the Court, aggressive interpretation of the
ATS’s scope would make the United States a “uniquely hospitable
forum,” 64 but at the same time, dangerously subject to imitation by other
59. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666-67.
60. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Determining Which Human Rights Claims “Touch and
Concern” The United States: Justice Kennedy’s Filartiga, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1695,
1697-99 (2014).
61. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (“We do not think that the existence of a cause of action
against them is a sufficient basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS
reach conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a
category unto themselves.”).
62. Id. at 1669.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1668.
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states. This implicitly rejected the premise that universal jurisdiction was
already established as an alternative that other states could embrace, but in
any event suggested that U.S. courts should not welcome its arrival.
III. Applying Non-Extraterritorial Statutes
Since the ATS consists of one provision, and Kiobel found that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was not overcome for that provision,
all claims under it are constrained to one degree or another. The key for
future cases is determining what remains—and it is here where the Court
was least clear.
A. The Requirement of Statutory “Focus”
Part IV of the Court’s opinion provided:
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the
United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application. Corporations are often present in many countries,
and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more
specific than the ATS would be required. 65
For some, this mysterious paragraph returned much of what the rest of
the opinion had taken. Claims in which “all the relevant conduct took place
outside the United States,” and which corporate presence was the only link
to the United States, were barred. In all other circumstances, however,
claims might “touch and concern the territory of the United States” so as to
admit U.S. jurisdiction. 66
What does it mean to “touch and concern the territory of the United
States,” including with “sufficient force”?67 The separate opinions arguably
spoke to the issue. Justice Kennedy, as previously noted, fanned hopes; his
concurring opinion allowed that
[o]ther cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of
international law principles protecting persons, cases covered
neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of today's
case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the
65. Id. at 1669 (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 10, at 20-26.
67. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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presumption against extraterritorial application may require
some further elaboration and explanation. 68
And what Kennedy put into doubt as to the presumption’s
“implementation” might be elaborated by Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
the judgment, which expressed the view that
[t]he statute provides jurisdiction where (1) the alleged tort
occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American
national, or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, and
that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind. 69
However, a much more restrictive gloss might be gleaned from Justice
Alito’s concurrence, which expressed the view that “a putative ATS cause
of action will fall within the scope of the presumption against
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic
conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies
Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
nations.” 70
These separate opinions reflect the views of seven members of the
present Court. Even so, there are good reasons for discounting them, at least
as anything easily reconciled with the majority opinion and with RJR
Nabisco. Justice Kennedy’s opinion is provocatively noncommittal; it
seems to reflect the view that the ATS does not overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality, but might have what some would view as
extraterritorial application in the future. To this extent, it sounded like an
attempt to stamp the Court’s decision as “a restricted railroad ticket, good
for this day and train only.” 71 Justice Breyer, who concurred in the
judgment only, got off the train a bit earlier. He disagreed with the
majority’s decision even to “invoke the presumption against
extraterritoriality” in the first place—which naturally impairs the ability to
reconcile his view with the implementation of it.72 And Justice Alito’s
concurrence, for its part, elaborates what he described as a “broader

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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standard” supporting the majority’s application of the presumption to the
case at hand, not an interpretation of the majority’s standard.73 It is
challenging to translate the rest of what he wrote into an understanding of
how the presumption should be applied, if applied it must be.
It is more profitable to begin by clarifying the majority’s task in Part IV.
Notwithstanding attempts to treat it as part of the overall opinion’s ebb and
flow, or as a meaningless coda, the issue remaining for the Court was
distinct and potentially significant. Having decided that the presumption
against extraterritoriality was germane (notwithstanding the statute’s
jurisdictional nature) and had not been overcome (notwithstanding, inter
alia, piracy), it remained to determine whether the claims stated by the
plaintiffs fell within the statute’s already-reckoned scope. This begat Part
IV’s question: did the claims state a colorable connection to the United
States, one with “sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application”? 74 A separate inquiry was warranted, as the
portion of Morrison cited by Kiobel suggests, because the presumption is
“often . . . not self-evidently dispositive,” as “its application requires further
analysis.” 75 In Morrison, as in Kiobel, the Court considered whether—
despite the fact that the statute in question did not apply extraterritorially—
it nonetheless applied to the facts alleged in that case because domestic
activity had been alleged. 76 The problem, often, is not just whether any
domestic connection is evident, but also whether enough is; most cases of
prohibited extraterritorial application involve some contact with U.S.
territory, and “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be
a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved.” 77 In Morrison, the Court resolved that
question by determining that because the “focus” of the Securities
Exchange Act was “purchases and sales . . . in the United States,” rather
than “the place where the deception originated,” facts of the latter sort were
not sufficient. 78
Part IV of Kiobel strongly resembled this aspect of Morrison. To be sure,
the Court’s phrasing was awkward. It is odd to say that the presumption is

73. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 266-73 (2010)).
75. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
76. Id. at 266-67.
77. Id. at 266.
78. Id.

2016]

KIOBEL AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

37

“displace[d]” if there is sufficient activity79—the presumption remains, and
limits the statute, but fails to foreclose the claim. It is also odd to put this in
terms of whether the claims “touch and concern” U.S. territory, language
more familiar from property servitudes.80 This led some courts applying
Kiobel to question whether the Court adopted Morrison’s “focus” test,
partly because of the Court’s unusual language, partly because of its brevity
on the question, and partly because of problems posed by transposing a
“focus” test to the ATS. 81 Most courts, however, properly assumed
continuity between the Court’s decisions. 82 That assumption seems to have
been vindicated by RJR Nabisco, which stated plainly that both Morrison
and Kiobel contemplated a “focus” inquiry—the difference being that
Kiobel did not require, on its facts, any resolution of what the ATS’s focus
actually was, since there was nothing domestic about the allegations at all. 83

79. See Kiobel, 122 S. Ct. at 1669.
80. See Carlos M. Vázquez, Things We Do with Presumptions: Reflections on Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1719, 1741-47 (2014), for a close analysis.
Professor Vázquez concludes that “displace” plausibly refers to the possibility of concluding
that the presumption is wholly inapplicable, relying in large part on Justice Kennedy’s
opinion; he acknowledges, however, that the majority opinion contained contrary
indications, which in my view counsel decisively in the opposite direction—in part because
Part IV, whatever its lack of clarity, is clearer yet than Justice Kennedy. Id. at 1747.
81. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[Kiobel]
did not explicitly adopt Morrison’s focus test, and chose to use the phrase ‘touch and
concern’ rather than the term ‘focus’ when articulating the legal standard it did adopt.
Moreover . . . the concurring opinions . . . note that the standard in [Kiobel] leaves ‘much
unanswered.’ Additionally, since the focus test turns on discerning Congress’s intent when
passing a statute, it cannot sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common law claims
based on international legal norms” (citations omitted)).
82. See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (stressing consistency of Kiobel with
Morrison); Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2014) (treating
Kiobel as consistent with “focus” test); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182-86 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“Drawing upon the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Morrison and
Kiobel . . . a clear principle emerges for conducting the extraterritoriality-related
jurisdictional analysis required by the ATS: that the ‘focus’ of the ATS is on conduct and on
the location of that conduct.”).
83. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100-01 (2016). Post-RJR
Nabisco attempts to suggest to the contrary—that is, to dispute whether the Supreme Court
regards Kiobel as establishing a different test than Morrison, putting aside the merits of that
position—seem to me indefensible. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Cross-Petitioner at 7,
Warfaa v. Ali, No. 15-1464 (U.S. July 19, 2016) (representing that “[a]s this Court
acknowledged in RJR Nabisco, the Kiobel test is not the ‘focus’ test set forth in Morrison”).
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B. Determining the “Focus” of the ATS
The problem with Part IV lies less in discerning the question the Court
was positing than in determining its method for answering it. In Morrison,
the Court was evaluating activity both inside and outside the United
States. 84 But its test, particular to the Exchange Act, was derived from what
the “focus” of the Act revealed about the focus of congressional concern—
which the Court thought centered on the purchase and sale of securities,
rather than deceptive conduct, which was not punished save in tandem with
such purchase and sale. 85 Of course, one might say that the purchase and
sale of securities was not punished absent deceptive conduct, which might
lead one to focus instead on where the deception was conducted. But the
path the Court chose had the virtue of entailing focal points with
determinate geography (transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges and, somewhat less concretely, domestic purchases and sales of
other securities) that were regulated as such by the Act. 86
Neither Kiobel nor RJR Nabisco advanced the state of the art. In Kiobel,
Part IV of the majority opinion supposed that future claims must “touch and
concern the territory of the United States,” and that “it would reach too far
to say that mere corporate presence suffices.” 87 Other clues, including from
the concurring opinions, are examined below, but RJR Nabisco (as just
noted) thought that Kiobel did not actually reach the issue of the ATS’s
focus. 88 In RJR Nabisco itself, the Court found that much of RICO
overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality, thus mooting the
question of the statute’s “focus” with respect to those provisions. 89 But the
Court subjected the statutory private cause of action to a separate
application of the presumption, which that provision did not overcome; 90
then, not wholly unlike Kiobel, the Court limited any “focus” inquiry
because the plaintiffs had waived their claims for domestic injuries. 91 For
reasons the Court did not detail, it assumed that Congress had focused, as

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267-69 (2010).
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 266-68.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2103-04 (2016).
Id. at 2106-10.
Id. at 2011.
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relevant for extraterritoriality purposes, on where the injury was suffered, as
opposed to one of the other elements of the cause of action. 92
The difficulties posed by the “focus” inquiry for cases like Morrison and
RJR Nabisco are redoubled for the ATS. That statute tells us only that
Congress intended to create jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 93 Courtesy of Sosa, we also know that Congress
contemplated judicial recognition of a “modest number” of claims, “based
on the present-day law of nations,” that “rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” of which
Congress must have been aware. 94 If Congress had a “focus” in addressing
such disparate and contingent matters, it is not easy to discern; 95 the
obvious breadth of the law of nations is compounded further when the
disparate and contingent quality of U.S. treaties is thrown in the mix.
Nevertheless, not unlike the quick turn to the place of injury in RJR
Nabisco, Kiobel leaped to some conclusions. The first concerned the
indispensability of territoriality, and conduct within a territory, as a
component of focus. 96 Naturally, some (perceived) extraterritorial reach is
the predicate for raising the presumption against extraterritoriality in the
first place. The problem to which the Court directed the parties was one in
which “violations of the law of nations occur[ed] within the territory of a
sovereign other than the United States” 97 or, as it put the question more
frequently, one of “extraterritorial application” of the ATS.98 Still more
concretely, the Court characterized the presumption as being triggered by

92. See id. at 2102-03. For discussion of the legitimacy of this assumption, see William
S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 45,
47-48 (2016); Carlos M. Vázquez, Out-Beale-ing Beale, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 68, 70-71
(2016).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004). See also id. at 732 (alluding
to “specific, universal, and obligatory” norms (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994))).
95. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014).
96. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
97. Id. at 1663 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012)
(Mem.)).
98. Id. at 1664, 1669.
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“conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign,” 99 and took it as a
given that such conduct was what made the presumption relevant.100
One might in principle distinguish between what triggers the
germaneness of the presumption (so as to initiate the first step of the
inquiry) from the statute’s “focus” for purposes of the doctrine’s second
step. One might in particular resist the leap from concern about territoriality
to concentrating on conduct within a territory, not least because—as the
Court acknowledged in recognizing the distinctive posture of Kiobel—the
ATS itself “does not directly regulate conduct.” 101 But the Court considered
elaboration of the statutory focus irrelevant because “all the relevant
conduct took place outside the United States,”102 which presumed that the
ATS’s “focus” was something requiring at least some degree of relevant
conduct within the United States. Even Part IV’s choice of terms, however
confusing in other respects, signaled—through both “displace” and “touch
and concern,” concepts paying a neighborly visit from real property—the
majority’s resolute focus on territory. 103 At a minimum, nothing in Kiobel
operated to disturb the emphatically territorial character of the focus inquiry
as elaborated in other cases. In practical terms, the focus test as
administered by the Court was really a locus test, and one in which conduct
was key. 104
A related implication was that—unlike the sub-statutory examination of
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality had been overcome,
which apparently required distinguishing between piracy and other
claims 105—this “focus” inquiry was administered on a statutory basis, rather
than with respect to a particular claim and its customary international law
99. Id. at 1664.
100. Id. at 1665 (“conduct within the territory of another sovereign”); id. at 1666
(“conduct in the territory of a foreign sovereign”); id. (“conduct in the territory of another
sovereign”); id. at 1667 (“conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another
sovereign”); id. (“conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign”); id. at
1669 (“conduct occurring in the territory of another sovereign”). The Court also contrasted
conduct within U.S. territory. Id. at 1666-67.
101. Id. at 1664.
102. Id. at 1669.
103. Id.
104. For similar readings by lower courts, see, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 197 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that “the focus is on conduct that violates
international law,” but emphasizing location); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185
(2d Cir. 2014) (stating that, as applied to the ATS, a “focus” analysis entails “examining the
conduct alleged to constitute violations of the law of nations, and the location of that
conduct”).
105. See discussion supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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basis. 106 The plaintiffs in Kiobel had seven different claims, at least three of
which the district court had perceived might involve violations of the law of
nations, 107 but the Court did not distinguish among them, and each phase of
its inquiry considered the ATS as a whole. 108 Given the restrictive
tendencies exhibited both in Kiobel and RJR Nabisco, one can envision the
Court establishing some kind of additional hurdle that needed to be
satisfied in the case of a particular kind of claim—say, accusing a foreign
ally of the crime of aggression109—but there was little in Kiobel suggesting
that a particular claim could be more easily rescued at the second step.
The problems this poses are evident in the final substantive line of the
majority opinion, which states, after alluding to “mere corporate presence”
as lacking sufficient force, that “[i]f Congress were to determine otherwise,
a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.” 110 The difficulty,
as the Court appreciated, is that the ATS not only lacked sufficient
specificity to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, but
likewise lacked anything sufficiently specific to establish a particular
“focus” for purposes of the second step. 111 Absent contrary congressional
instruction, the Court was disposed to view domestic conduct as its
universal template for applying even those statutes bearing indirectly on
conduct.
C. Specific Components of ATS “Focus”
Some post-Kiobel commentary speculated, not without reason, that
future ATS actions might enjoy a different fate if the facts were just a bit
different—that is, if the “foreign-cubed” facts in Kiobel were instead
“foreign-squared,” with greater U.S. ties possible not solely through the
conduct’s U.S. location, but also via the defendant’s nationality or perhaps
even something about the plaintiff (who must, of course, remain an “alien”
to recover under the ATS). 112 That was certainly suggested by Justice
106. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664, 1669.
107. Id. at 1663.
108. See id. at 1663, 1665, 1669. Justice Kennedy may well not have shared this
assumption, but he did not elaborate. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109. This would be in addition to the “limiting principles” like “exhaustion, forum non
conveniens, and comity” on which Justice Breyer would depend. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
110. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion).
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open to
“Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http:// www.scotus
blog.com/2013/04/Kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/
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Breyer’s opinion, which would have opened inquiry into a wider array of
considerations; 113 Justice Alito’s approach, on the other hand, would
disregard variations on the facts not relating to the place of conduct. 114
Although more detailed, the Court’s “focus” analysis in Morrison and RJR
Nabisco was not entirely straightforward, so one must proceed with caution.
Nevertheless, several types of claims might survive truncation of the ATS,
and they can be assessed from most plausible to least.
1. Claim-Related Conduct in the United States (and Elsewhere)
Although the Court did not formally address the ATS’s “focus” for step
two purposes, there are plenty of indications—the Court’s predicate for
raising the issue of extraterritoriality, discussions of the presumption in
Kiobel and other cases, and the opening of Part IV—that “relevant conduct”
within the United States may establish a claim under the ATS. 115 The
extremes are easy enough to address. If all the relevant conduct was within
the United States, the issue of extraterritoriality would not even arise; if
none was within the United States, Part IV suggests that the claim is a nonstarter. The question is what degree of conduct within the United States
might, at least if combined with some other factor (or a complement of
conduct outside the United States), establish an ATS claim.
Justice Alito answered that the U.S. conduct must itself be sufficient to
establish a claim under the ATS, making any conduct outside the United
States essentially irrelevant to the inquiry. 116 That approach has attracted
support in the lower courts, at least in the Second Circuit,117 but it has
(“‘Foreign cubed’ cases . . . are off the table. But there may remain significant scope for
‘foreign squared’ cases—cases in which the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where
the harm occurred on U.S. soil.”).
113. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673-74, 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. See id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1669.
116. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A] putative ATS cause of action will fall within
the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—
unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies
Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”).
117. The leading example is the Second Circuit’s decision in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.,
770 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014). There, Judge Cabranes stated—in elaborating a two-step test
that seemed to begin its step one, confusingly, with step two of the extraterritoriality test
indicated in RJR Nabisco—that
the complaint must plead: (1) conduct of the defendant that “touch[ed] and
concern[ed]” the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and (2) that the same conduct, upon preliminary
examination, states a claim for a violation of the law of nations or aiding and
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pronounced difficulties. Morrison addressed a case in which the plaintiffs
stressed that deceptive conduct, a key part of their claim, was stateside; 118
while the Court instead focused on the location of the transactions with
which that conduct was associated, it did not suggest that facts like those
the plaintiffs emphasized were also necessary, such that everything had to
take place within the United States. As to Kiobel, as previously noted,
Justice Alito did not purport to be translating the majority’s approach, but
rather establishing his own standard; 119 only Justice Thomas joined him, so
three justices joining the majority opinion (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and the late Justice Scalia) eschewed his approach.
On its merits, moreover, Justice Alito’s approach is dubious. It is
completely tenable, even in a globalized economy, to assume that Congress
would sometimes expect a statute to apply only to torts that were entirely
home-grown. But that seems less likely for the ATS, where Justice Alito’s
approach would not only avoid foreign territory, but also subvert piracy
policy, given the indispensability of the high seas to such claims. Even if it
is too much to allow piracy claims to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality for all ATS claims, it seems a substantial step further to
suggest that those claims or their analogs are excluded altogether from the
scope of the statute.
It’s coming up with an alternative that is hard. For anything short of
Justice Alito’s approach, the challenge lies in reckoning the appropriate
amount of relevant conduct that would be sufficient, if sufficiency is to be
something short of complete sufficiency for purposes of stating a claim
satisfying Sosa. Perhaps “extensive ‘relevant conduct’ in United States
territory” is enough, 120 or perhaps the relevant conduct must be alleged “to
a degree necessary to overcome the presumption”; 121 perhaps just “enough”
relevant conduct is enough. 122 Morrison, however, found that a similar
approach (“significant and material conduct,” proposed by the Solicitor
abetting another's violation of the law of nations.
Id. at 187 (alterations in original); see id. at 182 (explaining that “[a]n evaluation of the
presumption's application to a particular case is essentially an inquiry into whether the
domestic contacts are sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all”); accord Licci By
Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Mastafa,
770 F.3d at 186); Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2015) (same).
118. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-67 (2010).
119. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring).
120. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). Accord
Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2016).
121. Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).
122. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 597 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).
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General) was insufficiently premised in the statute at issue; the Court also
expressed a countervailing concern about developing the United States as a
locus for foreign-concerned litigation, one echoed in both Sosa and
Kiobel. 123 Or perhaps one might ask whether the “last event necessary to
make an actor liable” took place, though that has more than its share of
problems. 124
It may be helpful to look at the particular claims to determine more
exactly the nature of the conduct that is relevant, as several lower courts
have done. 125 In the end, however, it is hard to see how that avoids the
underlying problem, in that it still requires assessing whether “location of
the [relevant conduct] alleged in general terms . . . outweigh[s] the
extraterritorial location of the rest of Plaintiffs' claims”—or loosely
affiliated inquiries into whether the “allegations of domestic conduct” are
“extensive or specific” enough. 126 As discussed below, moreover, it is
doubtful that any ATS claim can ever, by virtue of its nature, be
substantially disassociated from U.S. territory.
This basic conundrum—deciding how much is enough—admits of no
easy answers, other than Justice Alito’s, but the severity of its result can
certainly be ameliorated. For example, it may be possible to expand slightly
Congress’s supposed focus on conduct within the United States to
encompass conduct outside the United States but not within foreign states—
as with ordinary claims of piracy. Post-Kiobel cases have suggested that
piracy constitutes an exception to its analysis, or perhaps an instance in
which the presumption is overcome, 127 relying on language in Kiobel
suggesting that piracy could not be extrapolated to the other matters 128 and

123. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270-72.
124. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (AM. LAW INST. 1934); see
Vazquez, supra note 80, at 1739-40 (discussing the first Restatement’s compatibility with
Morrison). The first Restatement was not followed in this regard by the Restatement
(Second), nor is it likely to be followed by the Restatement Third. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016).
125. See Drummond, 782 F.3d at 597-99; Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 18283, 185, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591-92 (9th Cir. 2014);
Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528-29.
126. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 598.
127. See, e.g., Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 153 F.
Supp. 3d 1291, 1303-04, 1304 n.14 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
128. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013) (“We do not
think that the existence of a cause of action against [pirates] is a sufficient basis for
concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur within
the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto themselves.”).
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distinguishing the prudential considerations.129 Alternatively, it might bear
on whether Congress’s focus—at the second, subsequent step, one only
gestured at in Part IV—was both on conduct within the United States and
conduct not within the territory of other states, which would enable
appropriate claims relating to piracy and other offenses.130 There would
remain, however, a place for territoriality, mixed with contra-territoriality,
and a need for clearer standards concerning when too much conduct
elsewhere—be that outside the United States, or within a foreign state’s
territory—tips the scales against.
2. Party Status: Nationality, Residence, and Domicile
Perhaps due to uncertainty about the quantum of domestic conduct
required, lower courts have also cited facts about the parties—such as U.S.
nationality of the defendant, or its domicile or residency in the United
States—as bearing on whether the claims “touch and concern” the United
States or, alternatively, bear on the “focus” of the ATS. 131 Other decisions
have rejected the relevance of such facts, 132 or more broadly, rejected the
129. Id. (explaining that high seas are “beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States or any other country,” and thus “[a]pplying U.S. law to pirates . . . does not typically
impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign.”).
130. See, e.g., Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 2015 WL 3745641, at *3 (D.
Alaska June 12, 2015) (applying the piracy “exception” to “intentional tortious interference
with maritime navigation, trespass and trespass to chattels, private nuisance, and civil
conspiracy deriving from each of the other three claims”).
131. See, e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 594 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It may well
be . . . that a defendant's U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one factor that, in conjunction
with other factors, can establish a sufficient connection between an ATS claim and the
territory of the United States to satisfy Kiobel.”); Drummond, 782 F.3d at 595-96 (finding
“citizenship or corporate status of the defendant[]” relevant to the “touch and concern
inquiry”). Drummond like most or all of these decisions, took the view that “it would reach
too far to find that the only relevant factor is where the conduct occurred, particularly the
underlying conduct,” id. at 593 n.24, but at the same time, found that U.S. citizenship of the
defendants—while relevant—was “insufficient to permit jurisdiction on its own,” id. at 596.
See also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-1357(RCL), 2015 WL 5042118, at *7 (D.D.C.
July 6, 2015) (holding corporate citizenship alone was not enough for ATS jurisdiction);
Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013);
Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321-24 (D. Mass. 2013).
132. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182-89 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating
that “[w]e disagree with the contention that a defendant's U.S. citizenship has any relevance
to the jurisdictional analysis”); see also Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d
184, 209 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting) (surmising from the majority’s failure to
mention a defendant’s status as a U.S. corporation that it found nationality and related status
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relevance of anything other than the location of the conduct—if all the
conduct occurred abroad. 133
There are conflicting signals from the opinions in Kiobel. Those inclined
to view the defendant’s nature as significant can cite the majority’s
dismissal of “mere corporate presence;” 134 this may be read as suggesting
that the presence of other entities might matter, or that corporate presence,
coupled with some other territorial indicator, would not only “touch and
concern” the United States but do so with “sufficient force.” A defendant’s
links to the United States might also be considered to augment the
legitimate regulatory interests of the United States and, to a degree, reduce
the likelihood of foreign objection. Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the
judgment, at least, described a defendant’s status as an American national
as highly salient. 135
Still, the difficulties with such actor-specific factors are easy to
anticipate. For one, Part IV of the opinion, which briefly mentions
corporate presence as part of a hurried coda, is a flimsy basis for
extrapolating the majority’s interest in such considerations. Earlier in the
opinion, the Court noted that Attorney General Bradford’s opinion
addressed conduct by U.S. citizens without suggesting that citizenship (or
residence) might be enough, 136 and instead the Court harped on the location
of conduct. 137 Subsequently, in RJR Nabisco, the Court rejected the
defendant’s arguments that the RICO statute should apply only to domestic
enterprises because that “would lead to difficult line-drawing and
counterintuitive results”; this was largely because it would be divorced
from conduct, but also because there was no indication that Congress had

factors irrelevant, and signaling disagreement); Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 660-61 (4th
Cir. 2016) (noting, on the one hand, that “[n]othing in this case involved U.S. citizens, the
U.S. government, U.S. entities, or events in the United States,” but also suggesting that
“[m]ere happenstance of residency”—on the facts of that case, an “after-acquired residence
in the United States long after the alleged events of abuse”—“lacking any connection to the
relevant conduct, is not a cognizable consideration in the ATS context”).
133. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190-92 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]f all the relevant
conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”).
134. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
135. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting “that the statute
provides jurisdiction where,” inter alia, “the defendant is an American national”).
136. Id. at 1667-68 (majority opinion).
137. Id. at 1662, 1664, 1665 (focusing on “conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign
sovereign”).
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taken on the imponderables of deciding based on the location of an entity
rather than on location of conduct. 138
In neither instance was the Court undertaking a “focus” analysis, but
rather addressing the prior question of whether the presumption had been
overcome, so its observations were not completely apposite. Unfortunately,
neither was Justice Breyer’s opposing instinct to credit nationality. 139 His
point was entirely fair: a defendant’s nationality, at least if it were material
to Congress, might reinforce an inference that the statute was not delimited
on another, territorial basis. 140 However, that reasoning drove him to
conclude that ATS overcame any presumption against extraterritoriality—
which, if stare decisis holds, is more difficult to claw back than anything in
Part IV.
In contrast, the majority’s lack of interest in party status seems to be a
continuous thread connecting the first and second steps of its inquiry; 141 if
the statute were conceded to be only territorial in scope, as the majority
would have it, it is not clear that any of the opinions in Kiobel would regard
an actor’s status as decisive. Even the non-determinative salience of such
status, independent of its territorial character, may be doubted. Part IV
appeared to concede the potential relevance of “corporate presence” to ATS
“focus,” 142 but presence in the United States—even if it is not necessarily
exclusive, as the Court noted critically—steps as much toward territoriality
as it does toward American nationality.
If and to the extent party status is separate from territoriality, familiar
problems arise. If such status is not in itself a sufficient condition, its
significance—when it must be melded with an indeterminate amount of
U.S. conduct—remains indeterminate. It seems unlikely, at bottom, that
such status relieves plaintiffs of the burden of showing a substantial
quantum of territorial conduct, perhaps such as might by itself convince a
sympathetic court that the presumption was satisfied.

138. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2103-05 (2016).
139. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
140. Cf. id. at 1674-77 (citing U.S., international, and foreign examples differentiating
claimants and defendants on the basis of nationality). Likewise, at least, in principle, a
statute might overcome the presumption by indicating that it was relevant to aliens (though it
would be helpful if it were oriented toward global problems, or added “everywhere”).
141. See id. at 1668-69 (majority opinion).
142. See id. at 1669.
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3. Other Interests
Beyond the tort’s commission on American soil and the American
nationality of the defendant, Justice Breyer would have found jurisdiction—
seemingly on an independent basis—where “the defendant's conduct
substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest,
and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.” 143 That approach obviously
spoke to Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan; although Justice
Kennedy did not join, it is not hard to see its appeal to him, given the
reservations indicated in his concurrence. 144
In elaborating, Justice Breyer made clear that an “important American
national interest” could redeem jurisdiction “only where distinct American
interests are at issue.” 145 He made his meaning slightly plainer in discussing
the harboring of defendants, his leading example. 146 While Justice Breyer
agreed, seemingly, with Justice Story (and the majority) that the United
States should not aspire to be “the custos morum of the whole world,”147 he
felt that permitting jurisdiction when the modern-day equivalent of pirates
were present within the territory was consistent with a narrower,
differentiated role. 148
The reasoning remained hard to reconcile with what the Court had
communicated about the statute’s focus. Certainly, longstanding
international norms discouraged or even made illegal the harboring of
pirates, 149 and U.S. cases had found ATS liability in instances where other
kinds of defendants were later found in the United States. 150 Those
propositions were not, however, necessarily related. Harboring piracy’s
modern equivalents might be considered distinctive if it were wrongful for
the United States not to proceed against such defendants, but there was no
143. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
144. See id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
146. See id.
147. Id. (quoting United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551)). The majority also quoted Justice Story, but added that “there is no
indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum
for the enforcement of international norms.” Id. at 1668 (majority opinion).
148. See id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. Id.
150. See id. at 1675 (citing Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980),
and In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994)).
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attempt to show a degree of acceptance and specificity such as would
satisfy Sosa. 151 It is also unclear how Congress could be focused, in
legislating against torts in violation of the law of nations, on redressing
circumstances relating to a defendant’s presence that might materialize only
after the original torts were committed.152 A harboring factor would have
only a tenuous relationship to the focus of the underlying statute, unless
another actionable tort may be layered on—meaning that harboring would
satisfy the presumption only to the extent that such a tort did, indeed, arise
out of domestic conduct, being principally that of U.S. actors affording the
wrongdoer repose.
On another reading, harboring did less work, simply illustrating
circumstances in which international law acknowledged U.S. capacity
(rather than obligation) to proceed. A similar claim was made for U.S.
jurisdiction over its nationals, where Justice Breyer asserted not only that
“[n]ations have long been obliged not to provide safe harbors for their own
nationals who commit such serious crimes abroad,” but also that “[m]any
countries permit foreign plaintiffs to bring suits . . . based on unlawful
conduct that took place abroad.” 153 Unfortunately, that too seems
fundamentally incompatible with the majority’s approach. Per Chief Justice
Roberts, the issue was not whether the United States had a plausible basis in
international law for regulating the conduct, whether based on universality,
nationality, or some other ground—including an effects-oriented form of
territoriality that might be considerably broader than anything Congress
might envision. International impermissibility was not the predicate for
invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality, and in evaluating
whether it had been overcome, the Court likewise evidenced no concern for
the latitude afforded Congress by international law. 154 If anything, the
151. It may prove difficult, in fact, to distinguish a defendant’s presence in the United
States, as a “happenstance,” from a purposeful attempt to seek safe haven. In Warfaa v. Ali,
Judge Gregory reached a different conclusion than the majority, noting that the case
involved “a natural person who has sought safe haven” and that the defendant’s “afteracquired residence” in the United States was distinguished from a “mere ‘happenstance.’”
811 F. 3d 653, 663-64 (4th Cir. 2016) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing to additional facts not solely based on the location of the injuries sustained). Whether
a purposeful attempt to seek haven would then translate into “harboring” by the state itself is
yet another matter.
152. Cf. id. at 661 (majority opinion) (noting “after-acquired residence in the United
States long after the alleged events of abuse”).
153. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
154. See id. at 1668-69 (majority opinion). If anything, Morrison relied more heavily on
this. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (protesting that “[w]e
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evidence suggested its irrelevance. In acknowledging that Congress “can
indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct occurring abroad,”
the Court cited the example of genocide, a crime unambiguously
condemned under international law and subject to universal jurisdiction;
even there, the Court held the statute up as an example because it applied
(explicitly) where the alleged offender was, inter alia, “present in the
United States,” and governed “regardless of where the offense is
committed,” not because of anything directly relating to international
obligations. 155 The ATS provides, by comparison, little evidence that might
have persuaded the majority and little grounds for confidence that the Court
would reverse course were the issue presented as one of statutory focus.
Most fundamentally, Justice Breyer’s interest in identifying “where
distinct American interests are at issue”156 was antithetical to the majority’s
conception of the appropriate role for courts. For Chief Justice Roberts, that
issue was joined far before “focus.” 157 Congress, in the majority’s view,
was the body entrusted with and capable of determining whether there was
an unwanted clash with other nations; 158 its subsequent discussion of the
inherent dangers that U.S. courts supposedly posed was not, for all intents
and purposes, rebuttable at all, even where they might in fact be shown to
serve a distinctive U.S. interest. 159 While the Court remained concerned
about making the United States a “uniquely hospitable forum” for norms
that any state could adopt and enforce, it was not, similarly, open to the
reply that such a unique role might be appropriate, or even that its
opportunity to afford an appropriate forum was, if anything, the unique
feature. 160
Compatibility with the majority aside, Justice Breyer’s pursuit of
“distinct American interests” contains its own contradictions. His view,
recall, was that the location of the tort, the defendant’s nationality, or the
relation between the defendant’s conduct and an important American
know of no one . . . who even believed that under established principles of international law
Congress had the power” to regulate foreign securities exchanges).
155. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2006 ed., Supp. V)).
156. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. See id. at 1664-65 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 1664 (citing Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)).
159. See id. at 1664-65. Cf. RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100
(2016) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies “across the board,
‘regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign
law’”) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
160. Id. at 1668.
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national interest (like avoiding harboring) could each establish American
jurisdiction. 161 Presumably the same goes for other jurisdictions as well.
But if jurisdiction could in principle be exercised by the state where the
conduct occurred, the state of the defendant’s nationality, and the United
States as the defendant’s ultimate location, the distinctiveness of U.S.
interests surely wanes, and the risk of regulatory clashes that troubled the
Court seem more substantial. 162
IV. Conclusion
Although the application to the ATS of the presumption against
extraterritoriality arose suddenly in Kiobel—an iceberg materializing before
Lohengrin’s swan-pulled boat 163—it is of lasting consequence for the
statute’s scope, unless rethought. This rethinking might take the form of a
reconceptualization, in which the relevance of the presumption, or whether
it was overcome, or whether the statute’s focus may be reckoned by
unexpected means, is somehow refashioned. Such opportunity is always
available to a court of last resort, though RJR Nabisco made such a move
more difficult.
Perhaps such rethinking may be emboldened, eventually, by the idea that
statutory stare decisis loses force when it concerns a new constraint on a
statute that is over 200 years old. The first Congress could not, certainly,
have anticipated the nature of modern statutory presumptions; even if
confined by a presumption to U.S. territory, the scope of that authority and
its relation to the rest of the world—today’s “here” and “there”—would
likely have amazed it. For the time being, however, the Court’s conception
of the presumption against extraterritoriality, together with its notion of
territoriality, has assumed a place in U.S. doctrine, and must be properly
understood before any eviction can begin.

161. Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
162. See id. at 1669 (majority opinion).
163. The well-known metaphor is Judge Friendly’s, likening the ATS’s own sudden
appearance to Wagner’s mysterious knight. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015
(2d Cir.1975); see also Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F.Supp.2d 488, 495-96 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(detailing Lohengrin’s arrival), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir.
2012).

